Tag Archives: US dollar collapse

Why Do Currencies Collapse?

  • german-marks-from-the-weimarOver the past few years, there has been no shortage of people calling for the collapse of fiat currency. Marc Faber, Kyle Bass and Peter Schiff have all talked about the imminent collapse of at least one fiat currency or another. Yet the days roll on and nothing happens. So, why do fiat currencies collapse? What are the circumstances that might trigger such a collapse? And why are these gentlemen so agitated about the prospects for the major Western fiat currencies?
  • In order to understand why the value of fiat currency might suddenly collapse, we need to understand (a) why that fiat currency has value in the first place, and (b) what factors determine the value of fiat currency.
  • The view of The Money Enigma is that fiat money is a liability of society. More specifically, fiat money represents a proportional claim on the future output of society.
  • What does this mean in simple terms? Well, we can think about fiat money as a slice of pie that we hope to eat at some point in the future. The pie is the future output of society. The number of slices that the pie has to be divided into is determined by the size of the future monetary base. The value of fiat money varies according to the expected size of each slice of this “future output pie”.
  • Clearly, there are two reasons for why the expected size of our slice of future output pie might shrink: either (a) there is a smaller pie (less future output), or (b) there are more slices (higher future monetary base).
  • Hyperinflation Value of MoneyFiat currencies tend to collapse when expectations regarding both of these factors shift violently in the wrong direction. If the market suddenly decides that there will be a smaller pie (less future output) and more claims to that pie (a higher than expected future monetary base), then suddenly people expect each slice to be a lot smaller. Consequently, the value of fiat money collapses and prices as measured in terms of that currency surge higher, often leading to what is known as hyperinflation.

Why Does Fiat Money Have Value?

One of the best aspects of writing these weekly posts is the feedback that I receive from readers. Recently, I received a couple of comments from one of my regular readers regarding a post that was first published in February 2015 titled “Why Does Money Exist? Why Does Money Have Value?” This reader, who is a professional bond trader working for one of the big banks in Europe, simply observed, “Deserves to be studied line by line”.

While you may not have the time or the inclination to study that article “line by line”, the subject of why fiat money has value is an important one for which mainstream economics doesn’t provide good answers.

The view of The Money Enigma is that in order to understand why fiat money has value we need to answer a more general question: “why does any asset has value?”

Fortunately, there is a well-established paradigm that we can use to answer this question: a paradigm that can be applied to every asset, but one that for some reason is ignored by economists in discussions regarding money.

The paradigm is this: every asset is either a real asset or a financial instrument.

Real assets versus financial instrumentsThis distinction is important because it relates to how different assets derive their value. Real assets derive their value from their physical properties. Financial instruments derive their value from their contractual properties.

Real assets such as land and commodities derive their value from their tangible or physical nature. In contrast, financial instruments, such as bond and stocks, have little or no physical value. Rather, a financial asset is, by definition, a contract: financial instruments only have value to their holder because they represent a liability to another party.

Now, let’s apply this paradigm to the evolution of money.

Money began life as a real asset.

In ancient societies, it is likely that basic agricultural products were used as the first medium of exchange. Over time, gold and silver coins became a more popular and widely circulated form of “commodity money”.

This commodity money derived its value from its physical properties. Agricultural commodities could be consumed; gold and silver had value because they were rare and desired for their unusual physical properties.

At some point, the ancient kings and rulers decided that they didn’t want to pay their armies and workers in gold, so they decided to create something that would be “as good as gold”: a piece of paper that promised its bearer some quantity of gold or silver from the royal treasury.

This “representative money” marked the beginning of money as a financial instrument.

Representative money was nothing more than an explicit contract, written down on a piece of paper that promised the bearer some quantity of gold or silver on demand. Representative money only had value to its holder because it represented a liability to its issuer, normally the king or government of the day. More specifically, it represented a claim against the royal treasury for delivery of a real asset (gold or silver).

It is important to note that this representative money only had value because it created a contractual obligation upon its issuer. Representative money didn’t have value because it was a convenient medium of exchange. It didn’t have value because it was a useful unit of account. Nor did it have value because it was a “store of value”. It had value because it was an explicit contract and created a liability against its issuer.

All of these functions of representative money (medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value) could only be performed because representative money had value. Moreover, representative money only had value (and therefore, could only perform these functions) because it created an explicit liability against its issuer.

If we wind the clock forward another couple of hundred years, we begin to see the emergence of fiat money. The gold convertibility feature of representative money was removed.

In essence, the explicit contract that gave representative money its value was rendered null and void. So, why did this new fiat money retain any value?

The view of The Money Enigma is that when the switch was made from representative money to fiat money, the explicit contract that governed money was replaced by a new implied-in-fact contract. The old explicit contract that guaranteed gold on demand was cancelled, but it was replaced by a new implied contract that did promise something of value to the holder of money.

Why must this be the case? Well, as we discussed at the beginning of this article, every asset is either a real asset or a financial instrument. Fiat money is, quite clearly, not a real asset. Therefore, fiat money is a financial instrument and must derive its value from its contractual properties, even if the contract is implied rather than explicit.

There is a popular and nonsensical view that fiat money has value because it is a convenient medium of exchange. The problem with this view is that represents a circular argument: fiat money has value because it is accepted as a medium of exchange; fiat money is accepted as a medium of exchange because it has value.

The view of The Money Enigma is that fiat money can only perform its functions because it has value: it does not derive its value from its functions. Rather, the value of fiat money is derived from an implied contract that exists between the issuer of money and the holders of money.

So, when the explicit contract was rendered null and void, what was the new implied contract that replaced it?

While it is difficult to speculate on the exact nature of the implied contract that governs fiat money, there are a few things that we should be able to deduce with reasonable certainty.

Fiat money liability of societyFirst, the ultimate issuer of fiat money is society itself. While government may be the legal issuer, the ultimate economic responsibility for fiat money lies with society. Society can’t be the legal issuer of money because society doesn’t exist as a legal entity. Therefore, society authorizes government on its behalf to issue fiat money. However, while money may not be the legal liability of society, it only has value because it is an economic liability of society.

Second, if fiat money is a liability of society, then what does society have to offer the holder of money? The answer is the future output of society.

Fiat money is a claim against the future output of society.

When the government prints fiat money, the only reason we accept it is because we recognize that there is an implicit agreement between our society and ourselves that we can use that money to purchase real output at some point in the future.

In essence, when society creates fiat money, it is creating a claim against its future output. This leads us to our next question. Is the claim that fiat money represents a fixed or variable entitlement against that future output?

For those of you who are not familiar with finance theory, one of the defining characteristics of a financial instrument is that it typically provides either a fixed or variable entitlement to some future stream of economic benefits.

The view of The Money Enigma is that fiat money represents a variable entitlement to the future economic output of society. The entitlement to future output varies according to the amount of money on issue at that future point in time (the expected size of the monetary base).

In this sense, we can say that fiat money is a proportional claim on the future output of society. Therefore, the value of fiat money primarily depends upon (a) the expected path of real output growth, and (b) the expected path of the monetary base.

This isn’t easy stuff to understand, so let’s use a simple analogy.

Imagine that we are hoping to eat a big cake that is the future output of society.

Every dollar that is issued by the time the cake is served represents a claim to a slice of that cake.

Hyperinflation Value of MoneyProportional Claim Theory implies that the value of the dollar we have in our pocket today depends upon the size of the slice of the future output cake that we expect to receive in the future.

Clearly, there are two reasons for why the slice of cake that we expect to receive could shrink.

First, the cake itself could shrink. For example, the market might suddenly decide that future output growth will not be as strong as previously expected. If this happens, then the value of a proportional claim on future output will be worth less and the value of fiat money falls.

Second, the cake may be cut up into more slices. For example, people might suddenly decide that the monetary base will be a lot higher in the future. If this happens, then there are more claims against future output, hence every claim is worth less and the value of fiat money falls.

In either case, the value of fiat money would fall.

The important point to emphasize here is that the value of fiat money depends on long-term expectations. This isn’t a cake that we expect to eat tomorrow or next year, but a cake that we expect to eat in twenty years from now. I won’t bore you with why this is the case, suffice to say that fiat money is a long-duration asset and in a state of intertemporal equilibrium the current value of fiat money is determined by a long chain of expected future values.

In summary, this theory provides us with a basis for understanding why the value of fiat money might fall. But why does the value of fiat money collapse? What could cause such a sudden and violent loss of value in something that we use so frequently in our everyday life?

Why Does the Value of a Fiat Currency Collapse?

The collapse of a fiat currency normally requires an event to occur that results in the sudden realization that the future economic prospects of a society are greatly diminished.

The most obvious negative event that can cause a fiat currency to collapse is the outbreak of war.

Why might the outbreak of war cause a currency to collapse? Well, let’s think about it using our slice of cake analogy.

First, how might war impact the expected size of our future output cake? While there might be some near-term boost in war-related production, there would be a clear negative impact on long-term output if it became an extended war with high casualties.

Second, how might war impact the expected number of slices of that cake? In this case, the impact is clearly negative. A war is expensive and almost inevitably requires the government to print money in order to finance it.

If we take these two factors together, then clearly the expected size of our slice of cake will be a lot smaller: future output will be diminished and there will be a lot more claims against that output. In this scenario, it is likely that the value of our fiat currency would fall immediately. If a few key battles were lost and the outlook for the very survival of our society was in doubt, then clearly you would expect the value of our fiat currency to collapse.

This much should be obvious. But why, if there are no immediate wars on the horizon, are some market commentators calling for the collapse of the Yen, the Euro and/or the US Dollar? Why might a fiat currency collapse in peacetime?

In many respects, we can think of the value of fiat money as a vote of confidence in the long-term economic prospects of a society.

If the underlying economic strength of a society is strong, then it is reasonable for people to believe that long-term output growth will be solid and that the central bank will be able to limit the long-term growth of the monetary base to a modest level. In this scenario, the value of the fiat currency issued by that society should be well supported: people expect that the cake will be large and that they won’t have to divide the cake into too many slices.

However, if people suddenly discover that their society is built on shaky economic foundations, then they may start to doubt the long-term economic prospects of that society. For example, imagine that the US economy suddenly started to deteriorate and nothing that policy makers did seemed to help. What might people start to think about the long-term economic prospects for the US?

If it became apparent that the US economy was structurally weak, then people might decide that (a) long-term economic growth will be much weaker than previously expected, and (b) long-term growth in the monetary base will have to be much higher than previously expected.

How would this shift in expectations impact the value of the US Dollar? Clearly, this shift in expectations would have a very negative impact on the value of the US Dollar. Using our analogy, the cake would be smaller and it would have to be cut up into many more slices. The value of the dollar in your pocket would decline precipitously and prices, as expressed in dollar terms, would rise sharply.

The perfect storm for a currency collapse involves a violent shift in expectations regarding both long-term output growth and long-term money supply growth. Such a violent shift in expectations does not happen easily, but it can happen, even in peacetime.

My personal perspective is that the developed country at greatest risk of such a violent shift in expectations is Japan. Japan has accumulated staggering levels of government debt. The demographics of Japan are terrible: over the next couple of decades, there will be fewer workers to support more retirees. Moreover, Japan has expanded its monetary base at an unprecedented pace.

Frankly, it seems as though the market is in a state of denial regarding the outlook for Japan. For some reason, people seem to believe that Japan can grow its economy over the next twenty years while reducing the monetary base from its current extended level. This scenario seems very unlikely. But let’s hope that Japan can find a new way to reinvigorate its economy, a path that doesn’t involve printing money.

On a final note, if you are interested in the determination of foreign exchange rates then I would recommend “A Model for Foreign Exchange Rate Determination”. If you are interested in learning more about Proportional Claim Theory and why fiat money has value, then I would recommend the following posts: “Money as the Equity of Society”“The Evolution of Money: Why Does Fiat Money Have Value?” and “What Factors Influence the Value of Fiat Money?”

The Risk of Hyperinflation in the United States

  • The risk of an outbreak of high inflation in the United States is rising. We are approaching a critical point where the ability of the US economy to grow while the monetary base is reduced will be tested. If the US economy falters, or if the Fed blinks and fails to reduce the monetary base, then the value of the US Dollar, a proportional claim on the future output of the US economy, could fall sharply and prices could rise significantly.
  • The market value of money is the denominator of every money price in the economy. The view of The Money Enigma is that the market value of money depends primarily upon the expected long-term growth of real output relative to the expected long-term growth of the monetary base.
  • Presently, the market expects strong real output growth and a reduction in the monetary base. If these expectations are disappointed, then the market value of money could drop precipitously, triggering a period of high inflation.
  • Ultimately, the prospects for hyperinflation depend upon the “real health” of the US economy. If the US economy is an innovation machine that grows solidly as the monetary base is reduced, the value of money will be protected. But if the US economy is merely a house of cards supported by cheap debt, then hyperinflation is a real possibility.

Introduction: the rIsk of hyperinflation in the US

The value of the fiat money that we use in our everyday transactions depends on market confidence in the long-term economic prospects of our society. If confidence in the long-term future of a society is strong, then fiat money will generally hold its value well and inflation will remain contained. However, if confidence is suddenly lost, the value of fiat money can quickly collapse leading to what is known as “hyperinflation”.

While the risk of hyperinflation in the United States in the next five years may be small, the risk is rising. A collapse in the value of the major fiat currencies may seem unimaginable to most people, but the risk is material. The key to appreciating this risk is examining how money prices are determined and, just as importantly, understanding how money derives its value.

There are many who will scoff at the notion that the United States could ever experience hyperinflation. The recent run of weak US inflation data, the deflationary experience of Japan and the strength of the US Dollar have combined to create a false sense of security on this issue.

Hyperinflation in the United States may be a “black swan” event, but as discussed by Nassim Taleb and others, “black swan” events seem to be occurring more frequently than predicted by statistical models.

Most people tend to treat “risk” in a binary fashion. Either its significant enough that we need to care, or it is low enough that we just ignore it. Six years ago, the risk of hyperinflation in the United States was definitely in that first camp. But times have changed. This week we will discuss how a number of key economic factors are coming together to create a possible tipping point, a point at which inflation begins to accelerate and becomes very hard to control.

The key point that we will discuss this week is that the price level today depends almost entirely upon expectations of the long-term path of the “base money/real output” ratio.

Right now, the markets are very optimistic in this regard. Most people believe that, over the next 20-30 years, real output in the US will continue to grow at solid rates (2%-3% per year), while the monetary base will decline as the Fed gradually reverses QE before resuming its long-run trend growth (about 6% per year).

However, if these expectations shift even slightly, the value of the US Dollar could fall significantly and the price level could rise dramatically.

For example, if markets begin to appreciate that the historic growth rates of the US over the past 20 years simply can not be achieved over the next 20 years, then this will have a negative impact on the value of the US Dollar and a positive impact on prices (inflation will rise). Moreover, if markets realize that the US economy has become addicted to monetary stimulus and “can’t get off the drug”, then expectations for the long-term path of the monetary base will be revised up leading to what could be the most severe inflationary outbreak in modern US history.

Ultimately, determining the risk of hyperinflation in the United States comes down to a call on the “real health” of the US economy. Is the US economy an innovation machine that will grow solidly as the monetary base is reduced? Or is the US economy merely a house of cards supported by cheap debt?

While readers may be divided on the real health of the US economy, this week we shall explore why the real health of the US economy is the key issue in determining the risk of hyperinflation. More specifically, we shall explore why the price level is so dependent upon expectations of both the long-term future path of the monetary base and real output.

In order to understand this theory, we need to go back to first principles and begin with a simple question, namely “how are prices determined?”

What determines a “money price”?

The view of The Enigma Series is that every price is a relative expression of the market value of the two economic goods being exchanged. The price a good, in money terms, depends upon both the market value of the good and the market value of money. The market value of money is the denominator of every “money price” in the economy. As the market value of money falls, the “money price” of a good, all else equal, will rise.

Every economic transaction involves, at a minimum, an exchange of two items. The “price” of the transaction is simply the ratio of the quantities of the two items exchanged. For example, if the price of bananas is $3, then this means that you must exchange three dollars for one banana.

This ratio of exchange is determined by the relative market value of the two items being exchanged. In our scenario above, one banana is three times more valuable (in a market value sense) than one dollar. Therefore, in order for you to purchase one banana, you must offer three dollars for it.

In order for one good to have a price in terms of another good, both goods must possess the property of “market value”. For example, why does coffee have a price but sunshine does not? Most people would simply say that sunshine is “free”. But at a more fundamental level, the reason there is a price for coffee and not a price for sunshine is that coffee possesses the property of “market value”, whereas sunshine does not possess the property of “market value”.

For a good to have a price, it must possess the property of “market value”. Frankly, this is rather obvious observation. However, what the more important observation we need to make is that for a good to measure the market value of another good, that first good must itself possess the property of market value.

Let’s put that in terms that most are more familiar with.

In order for money to measure the market value of other goods (in order for “money prices” to exist in our economy), money must possess the property of market value. Furthermore, the “money price” of a good reflects the relative market value of the good in question (the “primary good”) and the market value of money (the “measurement good”).

Let’s think about this in abstract terms for a moment. Why can’t we express the price of all things in “sunshine terms”?

The reason we can’t measure the market value of all goods in sunshine terms is because sunshine does not possess the property of market value. We can’t measure the market value of bananas in sunshine terms because only one of the goods in the exchange (bananas) possesses the property of market value.

The reason we can express the price of goods in terms of money is because money possesses the property of market value. In any simple two-good exchange, the price of the transaction depends upon the market value of the “primary good” and the market value of the “measurement good”. If one unit of the “primary good” (for example, one banana) is three times as valuable as one unit of the “measurement good” (for example, one dollar), then the price of the primary good, in measurement good terms, is three units of the measurement good per one unit of the primary good (or, in the case of our example, three dollars per banana).

If the “measurement good” does not possess the property of market value, then we can’t express prices in terms of that good. We can only use money as a “measurement good” for our prices because it possesses the property of market value. Clearly, we can’t use sunshine as our measurement good (we can’t express prices in sunshine terms), because sunshine doesn’t possess market value.

So, let’s return to the main issue. What determines the price of one good, the “primary good”, in terms of another good, the “measurement good”? Is the price determined by the market value of the primary good, or is the price determined by the market value of the measurement good?

The answer is “both”.

In a barter economy, the price of bananas, in apple terms, depends upon both the market value of bananas and the market value of apples. The price of bananas, in apple terms will rise if the market value of bananas rises. More importantly, the price of bananas, in apple terms, will rise if the market value of apples falls.

Similarly, the price of bananas, in money terms, will rise if the market value of bananas rises or if the market value of money falls. If the market value of money falls, then bananas are relatively more valuable, even if they are not absolutely more valuable. Price is a relative expression of two market values. Hence, the price of bananas, in money terms, will rise if the market value of money falls (all else remaining equal).

Some readers may ask how this view of price determination reconciles with traditional “supply and demand” theory. The view of The Enigma Series is that every price is a function of two sets of supply and demand. Those interested in this idea should read a recent and very popular post titled “Every Price is a Function of Two Sets of Supply and Demand”.

We can extend this microeconomic concept of price determination to a macroeconomic discussion of inflation. In simple terms, rising prices across the economy can be caused either by (1) an increase in the market value of goods and services, or (2) a decrease in the market value of money.

The market value of money is the denominator of every “money price” in the economy. As the market value of money falls, all else remaining equal, money prices will rise.

The Ratio Theory of the Price Level, presented in the slide below, encapsulates this simple notion.

Ratio Theory of the Price Level

The key to the Ratio Theory, as with many of the theories discussed in The Enigma Series, is recognizing that the property of market value can be measured, at least theoretically, in absolute terms, that is to say, in terms of an invariable measure of market value. In the slide above, the market value of goods VG and the market value of money VM are both measured in terms of a theoretical and invariable measure of market value called “units of economic value”. Those readers who are interested in exploring the measurement of market value in both absolute and relative terms should read The Inflation Enigma.

Let’s return to the key point of discussion: hyperinflation.

The key takeaway from our discussion so far is that every “money price” in the economy depends critically upon the market value of money. Once this principle is appreciated, the key to understanding hyperinflation is an examination of what determines the market value of money, the denominator of the price level.

What determines the “market value of money”?

From a high-level perspective, the view of The Money Enigma is that the market value of a fiat currency depends upon expectations of the long-term economic prospects of the society that has issued that currency.

For example, the purchasing power of the US Dollar at any point in time depends critically upon market confidence in the future economic growth of the United States and the market’s trust that policy makers will manage the government’s balance sheet (government debt and the monetary base) in a prudent manner.

Hyperinflation develops when the market rapidly loses confidence in the long-term economic prospects of a society. Zimbabwe is a great case in point. Once the market begins to realize that underlying economic growth is poor (or worse, a country is going backward) and that the government needs to print more and more money just for the country to standstill from an economic perspective, the value of that currency begins to decline rapidly.

But why is this case? Why is the value of money so sensitive market confidence in the long-term economic prospects of a society?

The reason is that money is a long-duration, special-form equity instrument of society. More specifically, each unit of the monetary base represents a proportional claim on the future economic output of society.

We have discussed this basic thesis in a few posts recently, most notably “Money as the Equity of Society”.

While we will not go into all aspects of the argument in this post, the thesis of The Money Enigma is that money derives its value “contractually”. More specifically, there is an implied-in-fact contractual agreement between society (the issuer of money) and those that hold money (“moneyholders”) that the monetary base represents a claim to the future output of society. Moreover, money represents a proportional (as opposed to fixed) claim that future output.

In this sense, money is very similar to a share of common stock.

Each unit of the monetary base represents a proportional claim on the future output of society, just as a share of common stock represents a proportional claim on the future cash flows of a corporation. As the expected future cash flows of a business rise, the share price becomes more valuable. As the expected future shares outstanding rise, the share price becomes less valuable.

Similarly, the value of money depends upon expected future output and the expected future size of the monetary base. As the expected future output of a society rises, the value of a proportional claim to that output (the value of money) will rise. Alternatively, as the expected future monetary base outstanding rises, there are more claims to any given future output and, therefore, the current value of each proportional claim to that output (the current value of money) will fall.

Those readers who are math geeks might be interested in the slide below that illustrates the valuation model for money that is developed in the final paper in The Enigma Series, “The Velocity Enigma”.

Value of Money and Long Term Expectations

In essence, this valuation model is very similar to a valuation model for a share of common stock. The value of money rises as expectations regarding long-term real output growth strengthen (“g” rises). Conversely, the value of money falls if people decide that the monetary base will grow at a faster rate than previously expected (“m” rises).

Could hyperinflation happen in the United States?

Let’s bring the discussion back to the question at hand. Could the value of the US Dollar collapse dramatically at some point over the next 5-10 years?

Many commentators seem to believe that if the US Dollar hasn’t collapsed in value by now, after seven years in which the monetary base has more than quadrupled in size, then it will never happen. This perspective displays a stunning ignorance of the role that long-term expectations play in the determination of the value of money.

The value of money depends upon expectations of the long-term (20-30 year) path of the ratio of “real output/base money”. Although the recent QE program has quadrupled the monetary base, most market participants consider the program to be temporary. Moreover, over the past few years, confidence in the long-term prospects for real output growth in the United States have improved.

Both of these factors have supported the current value of the US Dollar, a long-duration, proportional claim on the output of the United States.

This experience is relatively typical of any country when it first experiments with money printing. Money printing boosts the economy and leads to upward revisions in expectations for long-term growth, a factor that supports the value of money and suppresses the price level. Moreover, the money printing is normally sold as a “temporary” measure: something that will be reversed once the economy is strong enough to support it.

“Temporary” increases in the monetary base should have little or no impact on the predicted path of the long-term monetary base and therefore should have no impact on the value of money and the price level.

In theory, the Fed could increase the monetary base by as little or as much as it likes without impacting the value of the US Dollar, provided that the increase is considered to be “temporary” in nature. Moreover, if the Fed’s actions boost confidence in long-term economic growth, then printing money could lead to a rise in the value of money and deflation!

But there is a catch. Sooner or later (and generally sooner), the “temporary” increase in the monetary base needs to be reversed. And this leads us to the interesting position in which we find ourselves today.

Current market expectations reflect what I regard as an extreme level of optimism regarding the ability of the US economy to grow as the Federal Reserve normalizes (shrinks) the monetary base.

In order for the Federal Reserve to normalize the monetary base, it must sell at least $2 trillion worth of US government fixed income securities. The inevitable impact of this will be higher long-term interest rates and “volatility” in investment markets.

Why is the problematic? Well, the bear case, which I support, is that debt levels in the US are too high and can only be supported by the current regime of low interest rates. To be fair, this is not just a US problem. Over the last thirty years, the entire Western World has taken on enormous private debts. The financial crisis in 2008 saw a brief private sector deleveraging, which has subsequently been reversed, but government debts have risen dramatically in the last 7-8 years.

Can the Federal Reserve reduce the monetary base without leading to a significant and sustained private sector deleveraging and a massive fall in economic output? If it can, then the value of the US Dollar should be preserved and inflation will remain a “non-issue”. However, if it can’t, then at some point markets will realize that the long-term path of the monetary base relative to real output is much higher than expected, leading to a significant decline in the value of money. If that decline in the value of money is significant enough, then the result will be hyperinflation.

Ultimately, this is a call about the “real health” of the US economy. Is the US economy an innovation machine that will grow solidly as the monetary base is reduced? Or is the US economy merely a house of cards supported by cheap debt?

If the first case is right, then inflation should remain contained. But if the bears are right, then hyperinflation is a very real possibility.